Under the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors (Paragraphs 6.1–6.5 — Pervasive Ethics on SQE1 & SQE2), compare the rule on Own-Interest Conflicts (Para 6.1), the two exceptions to Client Conflicts of Interest (Para 6.2), and the resolution of a clash between the Duty of Confidentiality (Para 6.3) and the Duty of Disclosure (Para 6.4).

Para 6.1 (Own-Interest Conflict): You must NEVER act if there is an own-interest conflict or a significant risk of one (ABSOLUTE prohibition—zero exceptions, client consent cannot cure it!); Para 6.2 (Client Conflict): You must not act if there is a conflict or significant risk of one between two or more clients UNLESS (a) the clients have a 'substantially common interest' OR (b) the clients are 'competing for the same objective,' AND in either case all 3 safeguards are met: (i) all clients give informed consent in writing, (ii) effective safeguards (information barriers) protect confidential information where appropriate, and (iii) you are satisfied it is reasonable to act for all clients; Para 6.3 vs. 6.4: the Duty of Confidentiality (owed to current and former clients forever, even after death) ALWAYS overrides the Duty of Disclosure (meaning you cannot disclose Client A's confidential information to Client B and must cease acting for Client B unless an effective information barrier with Client A's informed consent is in place under Para 6.5) — SRA Code Section 6 is the single highest-yield ethics topic across SQE1 and SQE2: (1) Para 6.1 Own-Interest Conflict = ABSOLUTE BAN (zero exceptions). (2) Para 6.2 Client Conflict = Banned UNLESS Substantially Common Interest (6.2(a)) or Competing for the Same Objective (6.2(b)) + written informed consent + effective safeguards + reasonable to act (Note: Buyer and Seller of land/businesses are on opposite sides of a negotiation and do NOT share a substantially common interest!). (3) Confidentiality (6.3) ALWAYS trumps Disclosure (6.4).

When the Duty of Confidentiality to former Client A conflicts with the Duty of Disclosure to current Client B, the Duty of Disclosure to the current client prevails

An Own-Interest Conflict under Para 6.1 can be cured if the client takes independent legal advice and signs a written waiver

A solicitor can always act for both Buyer and Seller on a contested commercial land transfer under the 'substantially common interest' exception of Para 6.2(a)

In English Criminal Law (FLK2), compare the two partial defences to Murder under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009—Loss of Control (ss.54–55) and Diminished Responsibility (s.52)—regarding the burden and standard of proof, qualifying triggers/conditions, and the effect of voluntary intoxication.

Both apply ONLY to Murder (reducing it to Voluntary Manslaughter): (1) Loss of Control (ss.54–55): once D raises sufficient evidence, the PROSECUTION bears the legal burden to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt; requires loss of self-control (need not be sudden) + a Qualifying Trigger (Fear of serious violence from V, OR things done/said of an extremely grave character giving D a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged—sexual infidelity alone is disregarded under s.55(6)(c), and acting in a considered desire for revenge is excluded) + Objective Test (a person of D's sex and age with normal tolerance/self-restraint might have reacted similarly); (2) Diminished Responsibility (s.52): the DEFENDANT bears the legal burden of proof on the BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES to prove an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition that substantially impaired D's ability to understand conduct, form rational judgment, or exercise self-control and explains the killing; uncomplicated acute voluntary intoxication alone is NOT a qualifying medical condition (*R v Dowds*) and cannot lower the objective tolerance standard unless D suffers from clinically recognised Alcohol Dependency Syndrome (*Asmelash*, *Stewart*) — This comparison is tested on virtually every FLK2 paper: (1) Both partial defences apply ONLY to full Murder (never Attempted Murder or s.18 GBH!). (2) Burden of Proof: Loss of Control = evidential burden on D, legal burden on Prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt; Diminished Responsibility = legal burden on D on the balance of probabilities! (3) CJA 2009 s.54(2) abolished the old 'sudden' requirement for Loss of Control (though longer delay increases the risk of being excluded as a 'considered desire for revenge' under s.54(4)), and s.55(6)(c) excludes sexual infidelity as a standalone trigger (though it may be considered as context alongside other qualifying triggers per *R v Clinton*).

Acute voluntary intoxication without alcoholism satisfies Diminished Responsibility under s.52

For both Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility, the Defendant bears the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities, and both defences are available to charges of Attempted Murder and s.18 GBH

Under Loss of Control (s.54), the loss of self-control must be 'sudden and temporary,' and discovering a partner's sexual infidelity is a standalone qualifying anger trigger

Under the SRA Principles (SRA Standards and Regulations), what are the 7 mandatory Principles governing all regulated firms and individuals, and how must a conflict between two or more Principles be resolved?

Act: (1) to uphold the constitutional principle of the rule of law and proper administration of justice, (2) to uphold public trust and confidence in the solicitors' profession, (3) with independence, (4) with honesty, (5) with integrity, (6) to encourage equality, diversity, and inclusion, and (7) in the best interests of each client; if Principles conflict, those safeguarding the wider public interest (such as the rule of law, administration of justice, and public confidence) take precedence over an individual client's best interests — The 7 SRA Principles apply at all times (including conduct outside practice where relevant to public trust and integrity). Under the SRA Standards and Regulations introduction, whenever two or more Principles conflict, the Principle that safeguards the wider public interest (specifically Principle 1: rule of law and administration of justice, and Principle 2: public trust and confidence) prevails over Principle 7 (client's best interests).

Principle 7 (acting in the best interests of each client) overrides all other Principles, including the duty to the court, unless the client commits treason

Honesty and Integrity have identical legal meanings under *Wingate v SRA*, and both yield to client confidentiality

The SRA Principles apply only to solicitors when acting in paid litigation matters, not in private life or non-contentious work

Under CPR Part 26 (as reformed by the Intermediate Track regime), what are the financial value bands and trial complexity criteria for the 4 civil allocation tracks, and what happens under CPR Part 36 if a Claimant equals or beats their own valid Part 36 offer at trial?

Small Claims Track: £100,000; if a Claimant equals or beats their own valid Part 36 offer at trial, from the expiry of the 21-day relevant period the Defendant must pay Indemnity Costs, enhanced interest on both damages and costs (up to 10% above base rate), PLUS an additional monetary sanction (10% of the first £500k of damages + 5% of damages between £500k and £1m, capped at £75,000) — Track thresholds under CPR 26: Small Claims £100k. Under CPR 36.17: (1) If Claimant EQUALS OR BEATS their own Part 36 offer (Judgment >= Claimant's offer), Defendant faces punitive sanctions from Day 22 (indemnity costs, enhanced interest up to 10% above base rate on damages and costs, plus the 10%/5% additional sum up to £75,000). (2) If Claimant fails to obtain a judgment MORE ADVANTAGEOUS than Defendant's Part 36 offer (Judgment <= Defendant's offer), split costs apply (Defendant pays Claimant's costs to Day 21; Claimant pays Defendant's standard-basis costs + interest from Day 22 onward).

Part 36 offers can specify a relevant period of 7 days and exclude interest

Fast Track covers claims up to £50,000 and Multi-Track starts at £50,000; a Claimant must BEAT (not merely equal) their Part 36 offer to trigger enhanced Part 36 consequences

If a Claimant fails to beat a Defendant's Part 36 offer, the Claimant must pay Indemnity Costs and a 10% penalty from the date the claim was issued

In English Criminal Law (FLK2), compare the *actus reus*, *mens rea*, mode of trial, and availability of Voluntary Intoxication (*DPP v Majewski*) across s.47 ABH, s.20 Malicious Wounding / Inflicting GBH, and s.18 Wounding / Causing GBH with Intent under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

s.47 ABH (either-way, 5 yrs max): requires an assault or battery occasioning Actual Bodily Harm, and the *mens rea* is ONLY the *mens rea* for the underlying assault or battery (intention or subjective recklessness as to causing V to apprehend immediate unlawful force or applying unlawful force—NO foresight of ABH is required, *R v Savage*); s.20 (either-way, 5 yrs max): requires unlawfully and maliciously wounding (breaking both dermis and epidermis) or inflicting GBH (really serious harm), with *mens rea* of intention or subjective recklessness as to causing SOME physical harm (need not foresee serious harm, *R v Mowatt*); s.18 (indictable-only, life max): requires wounding or causing GBH with SPECIFIC INTENT to do GBH (or intent to resist/prevent lawful arrest + recklessness as to some harm); under *DPP v Majewski*, s.47 and s.20 are BASIC INTENT offences (so voluntary intoxication is NO defence), whereas s.18 is a SPECIFIC INTENT offence (so voluntary intoxication CAN negate specific intent to cause GBH, reducing s.18 to s.20) — Master the OAPA 1861 ladder for FLK2: (1) 'Wound' requires breaking the continuity of the WHOLE skin (both epidermis and dermis, or inner mucosal lining of mouth; internal bleeding/broken bones without broken skin is GBH, not a wound, *C (a minor) v Eisenhower*). (2) *Mens rea* ladder: s.47 requires ONLY assault/battery *mens rea* (*R v Savage*); s.20 requires foresight of *some* (even minor) physical harm (*R v Mowatt*); s.18 requires *specific intention* to cause GBH (recklessness is never enough for the main limb of s.18!). (3) Under *Majewski*, voluntary intoxication can negate *mens rea* ONLY for specific intent offences (s.18 -> dropping down to basic-intent s.20).

s.47 ABH requires foresight of actual bodily harm, s.20 requires foresight of grievous bodily harm, and s.18 can be committed recklessly

Voluntary intoxication is a complete defence to both s.18 and s.20 GBH if the defendant was too drunk to foresee any harm

A bruise or internal fracture without breaking the external continuity of the skin constitutes a 'wound' under s.20 and s.18 (*Moriarty v Brooks*)

Under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR — FLK1 Dispute Resolution), compare the rules for Deemed Service of a Claim Form (CPR 6.14) versus Deemed Service of Other Documents such as Particulars of Claim served separately (CPR 6.26), and state the validity period of an issued Claim Form (CPR 7.5).

A Claim Form (CPR 6.14) is ALWAYS deemed served on the SECOND BUSINESS DAY after completion of the relevant step (posting, DX, delivering, or emailing), regardless of the method or time of day; Other Documents (CPR 6.26) are deemed served on the SAME business day if sent by instant method (email/personal service) BEFORE 4:30 PM on a business day (otherwise the next business day), or on the second day after posting by first-class post if that day is a business day; an issued Claim Form must have the relevant step for service completed within 4 MONTHS of issue (6 months if served outside the jurisdiction) — CPR 6.14 vs. 6.26 is a classic SQE1 trap: (1) Claim Form (CPR 6.14): ALWAYS deemed served on the 2nd business day after completion of the relevant step in CPR 7.5(1) (regardless of whether sent by first-class post, personal delivery, or email at 9:00 AM!). (2) Other Documents (CPR 6.26, including Particulars of Claim served after the Claim Form, which must be served within 14 days after service of the Claim Form AND within the 4-month validity window of the Claim Form): instant methods (email/personal delivery) before 4:30 PM on a business day = same day; after 4:30 PM or on a weekend/bank holiday = next business day; first-class post/DX = 2nd day after posting if a business day (otherwise next business day).

A Claim Form posted by first-class post on Friday is deemed served on Sunday, and the Defendant has 21 days to file an Acknowledgment of Service

Both Claim Forms and Other Documents are deemed served on the same business day if emailed before 4:00 PM, and a Claim Form is valid for 12 months from issue

If Particulars of Claim are served separately, they must be served within 28 days of issue of the Claim Form

In Constitutional and Administrative Law (FLK1), what is the strict time limit under CPR 54.5 for filing a Judicial Review claim in the Administrative Court, what is the 'standing' (locus standi) test under s.31(3) Senior Courts Act 1981, and how do s.3 and s.4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 preserve Parliamentary Sovereignty?

General Judicial Review claims must be filed PROMPTLY and in any event not later than 3 MONTHS after the grounds to make the claim first arose (6 weeks for planning decisions; 30 days for public procurement); the claimant must have 'sufficient interest' in the matter to which the application relates; under HRA 1998, courts must interpret primary and subordinate legislation compatibly with ECHR rights 'so far as it is possible to do so' (s.3), and if primary legislation cannot be read compatibly, the High Court or appellate court may make a Declaration of Incompatibility (s.4), which does NOT affect the validity, continuing operation, or enforcement of the Act of Parliament — CPR 54.5(1) imposes a two-part deadline for Judicial Review: 'promptly and in any event not later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose' (meaning a claim can be out of time for lack of promptness even within 3 months, though in practice compliance with 3 months generally suffices; planning JR is strictly 6 weeks). Under HRA 1998 s.3 and s.4, UK courts cannot strike down an Act of Parliament: if a s.3 compatible interpretation is impossible, a s.4 Declaration of Incompatibility leaves the statute fully in force while signaling Parliament/Ministers to consider a remedial order (s.10).

Only an individual whose personal property rights have been directly infringed has standing to bring a Judicial Review claim (pressure groups can never have standing)

Judicial Review claims have a 6-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1980, and a Declaration of Incompatibility under HRA s.4 strikes down the unconstitutional Act of Parliament immediately

The procedural exclusivity rule in *O'Reilly v Mackman* allows public law challenges to be brought freely by ordinary Part 7 claim forms after the 3-month JR deadline expires

In UK Inheritance Tax (IHT 1984 — FLK2), what are the Nil Rate Band (NRB), the Residence Nil Rate Band (RNRB), the £2 million RNRB taper rule, the 7-year Potentially Exempt Transfer (PET) taper relief percentages, and the 36% charity rate threshold?

NRB = £325,000 and RNRB = £175,000 (when a qualifying main residence passes to lineal descendants; tapered away by £1 for every £2 by which the net estate before reliefs/exemptions exceeds £2,000,000; both NRB and RNRB are transferable between spouses up to £1,000,000 total); lifetime gifts to individuals are PETs (completely exempt if donor survives 7 years; if donor dies within 7 years, PETs use up the NRB first in chronological order, and IHT on any excess over the NRB receives Taper Relief if death occurs 3–7 years after the gift: 3–4 yrs = 80% of full death tax [20% reduction], 4–5 yrs = 60%, 5–6 yrs = 40%, 6–7 yrs = 20%); death rate is 40% (reduced to 36% if >= 10% of the baseline net estate is left to charity) — High-yield IHT traps on FLK2: (1) Inter-spousal transfers (and gifts to charity) are 100% IMMEDIATELY EXEMPT (ss.18 & 23 IHTA 1984), plus annual exemption (£3,000/yr, carried forward 1 year max), small gifts (£250/person), marriage gifts (£5k by parent / £2.5k by grandparent / £1k others), and normal expenditure out of income (s.21). (2) Taper Relief (3–4 yrs: 20% reduction; 4–5 yrs: 40%; 5–6 yrs: 60%; 6–7 yrs: 80%) reduces the TAX PAYABLE on a failed PET, NEVER the value of the transfer—so a failed PET below £325,000 gets zero benefit from Taper Relief! (3) RNRB (£175,000) requires 'closely inherited' lineal descendants (children, grandchildren, stepchildren, foster/adopted children, or their spouses—NEVER siblings/nieces/nephews) and tapers at £1 per £2 above a £2m net estate.

The Residence Nil Rate Band (£175,000) applies when a deceased leaves their home to siblings, nieces, or nephews

Taper relief on a failed PET reduces the value of the gift itself even when the gift is below the £325,000 Nil Rate Band

Gifts between spouses are Potentially Exempt Transfers requiring 7 years' survival

Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE — FLK2 Criminal Litigation) and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA s.34), what are the police station detention time limits and review intervals, when can a suspect's right to legal advice (s.58) be delayed, and when can an adverse inference be drawn from silence under s.34?

Detention clock starts at the 'Relevant Time' (arrival at the first designated police station): initial maximum detention without charge is 24 HOURS; a Superintendent (or above) may extend detention up to 36 HOURS total for an INDICTABLE offence; the Magistrates' Court may issue warrants of further detention up to 96 HOURS maximum; detention reviews by the Review Officer occur at <= 6 hours after initial authorization and every <= 9 hours thereafter; delaying Legal Advice (s.58, up to 36 hrs) requires an INDICTABLE offence + authorization by a SUPERINTENDENT who reasonably believes access will lead to interference with evidence/physical harm, alerting other suspects, or hindering recovery of property; under s.34 CJPOA 1994, the court/jury may draw proper adverse inferences if D fails on questioning under caution to mention a fact later relied on in their defence at trial that they could reasonably have been expected to mention at the time (provided D had access to legal advice, s.34(2A), and no conviction can rest solely on silence, s.38(3)) — Critical PACE & CJPOA rules on FLK2/SQE2: (1) Detention limits from Relevant Time: 24 hrs -> 36 hrs (Superintendent, indictable offence only) -> 96 hrs (Magistrates' Court warrants). Reviews: 1st at <= 6 hrs after detention authorized, subsequent every <= 9 hrs. (2) Delaying s.58 Legal Advice (or s.56 right to have someone informed): up to 36 hrs max, Indictable Offence only, Superintendent authority, based on suspect leading to interference with evidence/witnesses, alerting other unarrested suspects, or hindering property recovery. (3) Relying on a solicitor's advice to remain silent does NOT automatically prevent a s.34 inference unless the jury accepts that the suspect genuinely and reasonably relied on the advice (and waiving privilege to explain why risks making the conversation admissible under *R v Bowden*!).

An Inspector may extend detention up to 48 hours for any summary or either-way offence, and detention reviews take place every 12 hours

A suspect who gives a 'no comment' interview on the advice of their solicitor is automatically immune from s.34 adverse inferences at trial

A defendant can be convicted of a criminal offence based solely on their silence during police interview under s.34 CJPOA 1994

Under the rule in *Milroy v Lord* ('Equity will not assist a volunteer and will not perfect an imperfect gift'), how must a settlor/donor transfer legal title to (1) Registered Land, (2) Shares in a Private Limited Company, and (3) Chattels, and when do the exceptions in *Re Rose* and *Strong v Bird* rescue an incomplete transfer?

Registered Land requires execution of a Deed (Form TR1) AND registration of the transferee at HM Land Registry (s.27 LRA 2002); Shares require execution of a Stock Transfer Form AND registration in the company's Register of Members; Chattels require a Deed of Gift OR physical delivery with intention to give; under *Re Rose*, equitable title passes in equity once the donor has done EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER necessary to divest title (e.g., signed the Stock Transfer Form and delivered it with the share certificate to the donee/company so no further act by the donor is needed); under *Strong v Bird*, an imperfect immediate inter vivos gift is perfected if the donor maintains a continuing intention to give until death and the donee becomes the donor's executor (or administrator) acquiring legal title on grant — Under *Milroy v Lord* (1862) and *Jones v Lock* (1865), a failed gift will NEVER be construed as a self-declaration of trust unless the donor clearly intended to assume the onerous duties of a trustee. However, under *Re Rose* [1952], if the transferor has done everything required of them personally (executing the transfer and delivering the transfer + certificate to the transferee or registrar, leaving only third-party board/Land Registry registration), a constructive trust arises immediately. Under *Strong v Bird* (1874), an imperfect immediate inter vivos gift (not a future promise) is perfected when the donee is appointed executor/administrator and the donor's intention continued unchanged until death.

If a failed outright gift is invalid for lack of delivery, the court will automatically construe it as a valid self-declaration of trust (*Jones v Lock*)

Signing a Stock Transfer Form and keeping it in the donor's desk drawer suffices under *Re Rose* because the donor signed the form

Under *Strong v Bird*, a promise to give £10,000 'at some point in the future' is perfected if the promisee is appointed executor

Under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA — B2B contracts) and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA — B2C contracts), how are clauses excluding or restricting liability for negligence treated, and what are the two limbs of remoteness of contract damages in *Hadley v Baxendale*?

Under BOTH UCTA 1977 s.2(1) and CRA 2015 s.65, any contract term or notice purporting to exclude or restrict liability for DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY resulting from negligence is automatically VOID; under UCTA s.2(2), excluding negligence liability for other loss/property damage is valid only if it satisfies the statutory Reasonableness Test (s.11); under *Hadley v Baxendale*, losses are not too remote if they arise (1) naturally in the ordinary course of things (imputed knowledge) OR (2) from special/abnormal circumstances actually communicated to the defendant at the time of contracting — Neither a B2B contract (UCTA 1977 s.2(1)) nor a B2C contract (CRA 2015 s.65) can ever exclude or limit negligence liability for death or personal injury. For property damage or economic loss in B2B contracts, UCTA s.2(2) applies the s.11 Reasonableness Test (assessed at the time the contract was made, with the burden of proof on the party relying on the exemption clause). Under *Hadley v Baxendale* (1854) and *Victoria Laundry v Newman Industries* [1949], abnormal super-profits are irrecoverable under the Second Limb unless the special circumstances were made known to the defendant at contract formation.

Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, a trader may exclude the implied term that goods are of satisfactory quality (s.9) if the consumer signs a waiver

A business-to-business contract under UCTA 1977 can exclude liability for death or personal injury if the clause is highlighted in bold red text and satisfies the s.11 reasonableness test

Under *Hadley v Baxendale*, a claimant can recover for lucrative sub-contracts formed after the breach even if the defendant had no knowledge of them at the time of contracting (*Victoria Laundry*)

Four friends (A, B, C, and D) purchase a freehold house together for £400,000 to live in, contributing unequally to the purchase price without an express declaration of trust. How are the legal and equitable titles held, and what is the result if A posts a written Notice of Severance (s.36(2) LPA 1925) to B, C, and D at the house by first-class post, suffers a fatal heart attack while driving home, and A's spouse intercepts and destroys the unopened letter the next morning?

Legal title is held by A, B, C, and D as Joint Tenants (since legal title can ONLY be held as a Joint Tenancy by up to 4 trustees under s.34 Trustee Act 1925); assuming they initially held in equity as Joint Tenants (or to sever any joint tenancy), A's written notice under s.36(2) LPA 1925 is VALIDLY SERVED as soon as delivered to the last-known abode (s.196 LPA 1925) even if A dies before it arrives or it is intercepted and never read (*Kinch v Bullard*), severing A's 1/4 (25%) equitable share into a Tenancy in Common (passing under A's Will/intestacy), while B, C, and D continue to hold the remaining 3/4 (75%) as equitable Joint Tenants inter se — Key Co-Ownership rules on FLK2: (1) Legal title is ALWAYS a Joint Tenancy (max 4 legal owners, s.34 TA 1925) and can NEVER be severed (s.36(2) LPA 1925). (2) Equitable Joint Tenancy CAN be severed during lifetime (never by Will!) by written notice to all other joint tenants under s.36(2) LPA 1925 (or by *Williams v Hensman* methods: act operating on one's own share, mutual agreement, or mutual course of dealing). (3) Under s.196 LPA 1925 and *Kinch v Bullard* [1999], postal service of a s.36(2) notice is complete upon delivery to the address (or posting by registered/recorded post if not returned undelivered), even if the sender destroys it after delivery or dies before reading. (4) When 1 of 4 joint tenants severs, the severing owner holds a 1/4 share as a Tenant in Common (equal 1/N share regardless of initial unequal contributions!), while the remaining 3 continue to hold the other 3/4 as Joint Tenants among themselves.

Because they contributed unequally to a domestic home without express words of severance, legal title is held as Tenants in Common, and A's notice is ineffective because B, C, and D never read it

A's notice severs the entire equitable Joint Tenancy among all four owners, leaving B, C, and D holding 25% each as Tenants in Common with each other

Severance of an equitable Joint Tenancy can be accomplished by a provision in A's Will

Under the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (s.46, as updated for deaths on or after 26 July 2023) and the Wills Act 1837 (ss.9, 15, 18, 18A — FLK2), what is the intestacy distribution when a deceased dies intestate leaving a surviving spouse and two children with a net estate of £600,000 (plus £22,000 of personal chattels), and what is the effect of a beneficiary's spouse witnessing a Will?

Under Intestacy (deaths on/after 26 July 2023), provided the spouse survives the intestate by 28 full days, the spouse takes: (1) ALL Personal Chattels (£22,000), (2) the Statutory Legacy of £322,000 free of tax and costs (plus interest from death), and (3) 50% of the remaining residue (50% of (£600k - £322k) = £139,000, for £461,000 cash + chattels total), while the two children share the other 50% of the residue (£139,000, i.e., £69,500 each) on the statutory trusts (contingent on reaching age 18 or marrying earlier); under s.15 Wills Act 1837, if a beneficiary or the beneficiary's spouse/civil partner witnesses a Will, the Will itself remains VALID, but the specific gift to that beneficiary is VOID (unless there are at least two other independent witnesses) — Crucial Wills & Estates rules on FLK2: (1) For deaths on/after 26 July 2023, the Intestacy Statutory Legacy for a surviving spouse/civil partner (where there are surviving issue) is £322,000 + all personal chattels + 50% of the residue (and the remaining 50% of the residue goes to the issue on the statutory trusts per stirpes, contingent on age 18; if there are NO surviving issue, the spouse takes 100% of the residuary estate). (2) Under s.15 Wills Act 1837, attestation by a beneficiary or their spouse/civil partner renders the gift to that beneficiary VOID while leaving the rest of the Will valid (unless superfluous because 2 other non-beneficiary witnesses also attested). (3) Marriage (s.18) revokes the entire Will (unless made in contemplation of marriage to that person), whereas Divorce (s.18A) leaves the Will valid and treats the ex-spouse as having died on the date of the final divorce order.

The Statutory Legacy is £270,000, and witnessing a Will by a beneficiary's spouse invalidates the entire Will under s.9 Wills Act 1837

The surviving spouse takes 100% of the entire £600,000 estate even when the intestate leaves surviving children

Under s.18A Wills Act 1837, a final order of divorce revokes the testator's entire Will just like marriage under s.18

Under the Companies Act 2006 (FLK1 Business Law and Practice), which company transactions involving a Director require approval by a Shareholder Ordinary Resolution (> 50%), and which two resolutions can NEVER be passed via the private company Written Resolution procedure (s.288)?

Shareholder Ordinary Resolution (> 50%) is required for: (1) Directors' Long-Term Guaranteed Service Contracts exceeding 2 years (s.188), (2) Substantial Property Transactions (s.190: non-cash asset > £100,000, OR > 10% of company net asset value AND > £5,000), (3) Loans to Directors > £10,000 (s.197/207), and (4) Payments for Loss of Office > £200 (s.217/221); the two resolutions that can NEVER use the Written Resolution procedure are removing a director before expiry of their term (s.168) and removing an auditor before expiry of their term (s.510), both of which require a General Meeting with Special Notice (28 clear days) — Remember that the four key Part 10 CA 2006 shareholder controls over directors (s.188 service contract > 2 years, s.190 SPT > £100k or [>10% NAV and >£5k], s.197 loans > £10k, s.217 payment for loss of office > £200) all require an ORDINARY Resolution (>50%), NOT a Special Resolution! And if the director is also a director of the company's holding company, the holding company's shareholders must ALSO pass an Ordinary Resolution. Finally, under s.288(2), removing a director (s.168) or an auditor (s.510) before term expiry can never be done by Written Resolution because both have a statutory right to be heard at a General Meeting following 28 clear days' Special Notice (s.312).

Substantial Property Transactions and Directors' Loans require a 75% Special Resolution; changing the company's name or Articles of Association cannot be done by Written Resolution

A director's guaranteed employment contract requires shareholder approval only if it exceeds 5 years, and a Substantial Property Transaction requires approval whenever it exceeds £1,000

Removing a director under s.168 requires a 75% Special Resolution at a Board Meeting

Across all 16 stations of the SQE2 Practical Legal Skills examination, how are marks weighted between Skills and Law, and what are the distinct objectives and timing of the 4 Oral stations versus the 12 Written stations?

Every SQE2 assessment station is weighted 50% on Legal Skills and 50% on Application of Law (correctness and comprehensiveness); the 4 Oral stations over 2 half-days comprise 2 Advocacy stations (Dispute Resolution & Criminal Litigation: 45 min prep + 15 min oral presentation) and 2 Client Interviewing + Attendance Note/Case Analysis stations (Property Practice & Wills/Intestacy: 10 min prep + 25 min oral interview assessed on skills + 25 min written Attendance Note/Case Analysis assessed on skills and law); the 12 Written stations over 3 half-days comprise 3 Case and Matter Analysis (60 min), 3 Legal Research (60 min), 3 Legal Writing (30 min), and 3 Legal Drafting (45 min) stations across all 5 practice contexts — SQE2 is a closed-book practical assessment (except for the Legal Research bundle and materials provided within each station) where every single station—written or oral—carries a 50% Skills / 50% Law weighting (graded A to F on a global judgment scale from Superior to Poor). In the Client Interviewing + Attendance Note station, the 25-minute oral interview tests listening, empathetic questioning, obtaining all relevant facts, and initial client-care advice (Skills), while the immediately following 25-minute Attendance Note / Case Analysis records the legal analysis, options, and next steps (Skills + Law).

SQE2 Legal Research provides access to live public internet search engines rather than a closed self-contained bundle of primary and secondary sources

SQE2 stations are marked 80% on communication style and 20% on legal accuracy, and candidates may bring annotated textbooks into all 16 stations

In SQE2 Client Interviewing, the oral interview is assessed 50% on reciting case citations to the client, and there is no written attendance note

In Criminal Litigation (FLK2 / SQE2), contrast an application to exclude a Confession under s.76(2) PACE 1984 with an application to exclude prosecution evidence under s.78 PACE 1984, and explain the test for a submission of 'No Case to Answer' (*R v Galbraith*) and disputed visual identification (*R v Turnbull*).

s.76(2) PACE applies ONLY to Confessions: if it is represented (or the court raises) that a confession was obtained by (a) oppression or (b) anything said or done likely in the circumstances to render a confession unreliable, the PROSECUTION must prove BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT that it was not so obtained—failing which exclusion is MANDATORY (though facts discovered as a result remain admissible under s.76(4)); s.78 PACE applies to ANY prosecution evidence (including confessions, illegally obtained searches, or Code D breaches) and gives the court a DISCRETION to exclude evidence if admitting it would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it; under *R v Galbraith* (at halftime close of prosecution case), the court MUST acquit if (1) there is no evidence of an element of the offence, or (2) the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is so tenuous/weak/vague (including poor, unsupported visual ID under *R v Turnbull*) that a properly directed jury could not properly convict — Master these criminal evidence rules for FLK2 and SQE2 Advocacy: (1) s.76(2) = Confessions ONLY, mandatory exclusion unless Prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt no oppression (s.76(2)(a)) and no unreliability-inducing conduct/words (s.76(2)(b)),regardless of whether the confession is actually true (s.76(2)). (2) s.78 = ANY prosecution evidence (never defence evidence!), discretionary exclusion based on adverse effect on fairness of proceedings. (3) Under *R v Turnbull* and *R v Galbraith*, if disputed visual ID is of POOR quality and UNSUPPORTED by corroborating evidence, the judge MUST withdraw the case from the jury at the close of the prosecution case and direct an acquittal.

If the police find stolen goods as a result of an inadmissible confession excluded under s.76(2), the prosecution is automatically barred from proving that the goods were found at the defendant's house

Under s.76(2) PACE, the defence must prove on the balance of probabilities that the confession is actually untrue; s.78 PACE applies to both prosecution and defence evidence

Under *R v Turnbull*, even when visual identification is poor (a fleeting 2-second glimpse in the dark) and completely unsupported by any other evidence, the judge must leave the case to the jury with a warning

In English Contract Law (FLK1), contrast the rule on varying a contract to pay MORE for existing duties (*Williams v Roffey Bros*) with varying a contract to accept LESS in full satisfaction of an existing debt (*Foakes v Beer* and *Re Selectmove*), and explain how Promissory Estoppel (*High Trees*) operates.

Under *Williams v Roffey Bros*, a factual 'practical benefit' (such as avoiding a penalty clause or the expense of finding a replacement subcontractor) is valid consideration for a promise to pay MORE for performing an existing contractual duty (provided there is no economic duress); under *Foakes v Beer* and *Re Selectmove*, practical benefit is NOT valid consideration for a promise to accept LESS in full settlement of a debt (*Pinnel's Case*, unless varied by Deed or new consideration like paying early/at a different place/with a chattel); Promissory Estoppel acts only as a defensive shield ('suspensory' for periodic payments, not creating a new cause of action per *Combe v Combe*) where reliance makes it inequitable to go back on the promise — The Court of Appeal in *Re Selectmove* [1995] expressly held that *Williams v Roffey Bros* (practical benefit suffices to enforce a promise to pay MORE for goods/services) cannot be extended to part-payment of debts, which remains bound by the House of Lords in *Foakes v Beer* [1884] and *Pinnel's Case* (1602). Absent fresh consideration (e.g., paying earlier at the creditor's request) or a Deed, a debtor must rely on Promissory Estoppel (*Central London Property Trust v High Trees House*), which requires a clear promise, reliance, no inequity by the debtor (*D & C Builders v Rees*), and operates only as a shield (*Combe v Combe*).

Promissory Estoppel can be used as a sword by a claimant to sue on a gratuitous promise where no pre-existing contractual relationship exists

Under *Williams v Roffey Bros*, a promise to accept part-payment of a debt discharges the entire balance whenever the creditor gains a practical benefit

Under *Stilk v Myrick*, any promise to pay additional money is automatically enforceable without consideration if made in writing

Under the SRA Accounts Rules (FLK2), distinguish between Client Money (Rule 2.1) and Business (Office) Money—specifically regarding how a firm must treat (1) money received from a client on account of costs and UNPAID disbursements before a bill is delivered vs. (2) money received from a client to reimburse a PAID disbursement that the firm has already paid out of its business account.

(1) Money received generally on account of costs and UNPAID disbursements BEFORE a bill of costs (or written notification of costs incurred) has been delivered is CLIENT MONEY under Rule 2.1(d) and must be paid promptly into the Client Bank Account (unless the firm qualifies for the Rule 2.2 exemption); (2) Money received from a client to reimburse a PAID disbursement (where the firm has ALREADY paid the disbursement out of its own Business Bank Account) is BUSINESS MONEY and must be paid directly into the Business Bank Account (even if no formal bill has yet been delivered!) — This is the #1 SRA Accounts Rules distinction tested on FLK2: Under Rule 2.1(d), money received for the firm's fees and UNPAID disbursements prior to delivering a bill is Client Money (and goes into the Client Bank Account). Conversely, once the firm has already paid a disbursement out of its Business Bank Account (a PAID disbursement) OR has delivered a bill of costs, money received from the client to pay for that paid disbursement or delivered bill belongs to the firm—it is BUSINESS MONEY and must be paid into the Business Bank Account.

Money received in payment of a delivered bill of costs is Client Money under Rule 2.1(d)

Both unpaid and paid disbursements are Client Money and must be held in the Client Bank Account until the matter concludes

Money received generally on account of future legal fees must be paid into the Business Bank Account upon receipt

A trustee breaches trust by paying £20,000 of Trust Funds into the trustee's personal bank account, which already contained £10,000 of the trustee's own money (Total = £30,000). First, the trustee withdraws £12,000 and buys shares in TechCo plc (which double in value to £24,000). Next, the trustee withdraws £10,000 and gambles it away at a casino (leaving £8,000 cash in the bank account). Finally, the trustee deposits £5,000 of personal salary into the account. Using equitable tracing rules (*Re Hallett*, *Re Oatway*, and *James Roscoe v Winder*), how should the beneficiaries trace and claim?

Under *Re Oatway*, the beneficiaries can cherry-pick and treat the first £12,000 withdrawal as pure Trust Money used to purchase the TechCo shares (claiming a constructive trust/equitable lien over the £24,000 shares for £12,000 of trust funds + £12,000 profit), while treating £10,000 of the £10,000 casino dissipation as the trustee's own £10,000, AND claiming the remaining £8,000 cash balance in the account (making the £20,000 trust fund more than whole at £32,000 total!); under the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (*James Roscoe v Winder*), the subsequent £5,000 salary deposit is NOT treated as trust money absent proof of intention to replenish — When a wrongdoing trustee mixes trust money with their OWN money: (1) *Clayton's Case* NEVER applies between a trustee and beneficiaries; (2) Beneficiaries may invoke *Re Hallett's Estate* (presuming the trustee spends their own money first when the withdrawal is dissipated) OR *Re Oatway* (cherry-picking to attribute profitable investments to trust money and dissipations to the trustee's own money!). Thus, £12,000 of trust money bought the TechCo shares (now worth £24,000), the £10,000 casino loss exhausted the trustee's own £10,000, and the £8,000 remaining cash in the account represents the remaining £8,000 of trust money. Per *James Roscoe v Winder*, equitable tracing cannot exceed the lowest intermediate balance (£8,000) to capture later personal deposits (£5,000).

Under *Re Hallett's Estate*, the trustee is irrebuttably presumed to spend their own £10,000 first on the profitable TechCo shares and dissipate the trust's money at the casino

Under *Clayton's Case* (First In, First Out), the first £10,000 in the account belonged to the trustee, so 10/12 of the TechCo shares belong to the trustee personally

The beneficiaries can trace into the £5,000 subsequent salary deposit to cover the casino loss under backward tracing

A law firm holds £5,000 on the Client Side of Client A's ledger. The firm completes the legal work and issues a formal Bill of Costs to Client A for £2,000 Professional Charges (Profit Costs) plus £400 VAT (Total = £2,400). Under the SRA Accounts Rules, what are the exact double-entry bookkeeping entries (1) when the Bill of Costs is issued, and (2) when the firm subsequently transfers £2,400 from the Client Bank Account to the Business Bank Account under Rule 4.3?

(1) On issuing the Bill of Costs: DEBIT Client A Ledger (Business Side) £2,400; CREDIT Profit Costs Ledger £2,000 and CREDIT HMRC VAT Ledger £400 (NO entries are made on the Client Side or Cash Sheet when issuing a bill!); (2) On transferring £2,400 from Client Account to Business Account (permissible under Rule 4.3 ONLY because a bill/written notification of costs has been delivered): DEBIT Client A Ledger (Client Side) £2,400 and CREDIT Cash Sheet (Client Account) £2,400; AND simultaneously CREDIT Client A Ledger (Business Side) £2,400 and DEBIT Cash Sheet (Business Account) £2,400 — Memorize these exact SRA Accounts Rules double entries: (1) Issuing a bill records that the client now owes the firm Business Money—it NEVER touches the Cash Account or Client Side: DR Client Ledger (Business Side) £2,400 / CR Profit Costs £2,000 + CR HMRC VAT £400. (2) Under Rule 4.3, before transferring money from Client Account for costs, the firm MUST first give a bill of costs or other written notification of the costs incurred to the client (and the transfer must be for the specific sum identified and covered by funds held for that specific client). The transfer requires FOUR entries (a pair on the Client Side taking money out of Client Cash, and a pair on the Business Side putting money into Business Cash to clear the Business Side debit balance).

(1) On issuing the Bill: DEBIT Client A Ledger (Client Side) £2,400 and CREDIT Profit Costs £2,400; (2) On transfer: DEBIT Cash Sheet (Client Account) £2,400

(1) On issuing the Bill: CREDIT Client A Ledger (Business Side) £2,400 and DEBIT Profit Costs £2,000 and VAT £400

The firm may transfer the £2,400 from Client Account to Business Account before sending the bill to Client A if the partner signs an internal attendance note

In Solicitors' Taxation (FLK1 & FLK2), compare the qualifying conditions and reliefs for Capital Gains Tax (CGT): Private Residence Relief (PRR), Business Asset Disposal Relief (BADR), Rollover Relief (s.152), and Hold-Over Gift Relief (s.165).

PRR exempts gains on an individual's only or main residence for periods of actual occupation plus deemed occupation (including the final 9 MONTHS of ownership unconditionally, plus up to 3 years any reason / any period working abroad / up to 4 years working elsewhere in the UK if preceded and followed by actual occupation); BADR taxes qualifying business disposals (whole/part of an unincorporated business owned >= 2 years, or shares in a personal trading company where the individual is an officer/employee holding >= 5% of ordinary share capital and voting rights for >= 2 years) up to a £1 MILLION lifetime limit; Rollover Relief (s.152) defers gains when proceeds from selling qualifying business assets (land/buildings/fixed plant/goodwill) are reinvested in new qualifying business assets within 1 year before to 3 years after disposal; Hold-Over Gift Relief (s.165) allows donor and donee to jointly elect to defer the gain on a gift (or sale at undervalue) of qualifying business assets — Key CGT distinctions for FLK1/FLK2: (1) Companies do NOT pay CGT (companies pay Corporation Tax on both income profits and chargeable gains, cannot claim the individual CGT annual exempt amount or BADR, and still receive Indexation Allowance frozen up to December 2017 plus Corporate Rollover Relief on land/buildings/fixed plant). (2) For individuals, BADR (formerly Entrepreneurs' Relief, £1m lifetime limit) applies only to disposing of the whole/part of a going-concern business (not mere disposal of an isolated asset used in an ongoing business, unless associated with withdrawal from a partnership/company), assets used in a business that ceases (disposed of within 3 years of cessation), or shares in a personal trading company (>=5% ordinary shares + voting/economic rights + officer/employee for >=2 years).

PRR exempts the final 36 months of ownership unconditionally, and BADR applies to an investor selling residential buy-to-let properties

BADR applies to individual disposals of individual business assets (such as selling one warehouse while continuing to trade) and has a £10 million lifetime limit

Companies pay Capital Gains Tax at 10% under Business Asset Disposal Relief and receive the annual CGT exempt amount

Under the SRA Accounts Rules, what do Rule 3.3 (Prohibition on Providing Banking Facilities), Rule 5.3 (Available Funds / Overdrawn Client Ledgers), and Rule 8.3 (Reconciliations) require?

Rule 3.3 strictly prohibits using a client account to provide banking facilities to clients or third parties—every payment into, transfer, or withdrawal from a client account must be in respect of the delivery by the firm of regulated legal services (e.g., holding sale proceeds simply to pay a client's unrelated personal living expenses or commercial invoices after conveyancing completes is a breach); Rule 5.3 prohibits withdrawing client money for a client unless sufficient funds are held on behalf of THAT SPECIFIC CLIENT (if a payment exceeds that client's balance, the shortfall uses other clients' money in breach of Rule 5.3 and must be replaced immediately from Business Money under Rule 6.1); Rule 8.3 requires obtaining bank statements and completing a 3-way reconciliation (bank statement vs. cash sheet vs. client ledger balances) AT LEAST EVERY 5 WEEKS, signed off by the COFA or a manager — Three strict red lines in the SRA Accounts Rules: (1) Rule 3.3: No banking facilities—client account movements must be intrinsically linked to an underlying regulated legal transaction (convenience to the client is no excuse). (2) Rule 5.3: Each client's ledger is strictly ring-fenced—you can never make a payment from Client Account exceeding the cleared funds held for THAT specific client (doing so raids other clients' money; use Business Money instead). (3) Rule 8.3: Mandatory 5-weekly three-way reconciliations signed off by the COFA or a manager of the firm (plus an external Accountant's Report within 6 months of the accounting period end unless exempt because average client balance <= £10,000 and maximum balance <= £250,000).

Rule 3.3 allows a firm to hold £500,000 of conveyancing proceeds in its client account for 6 months to pay the client's builders and school fees if the client has no UK bank account

Rule 5.3 allows a firm to use Client B's surplus client money to pay a court fee for Client A provided Client A's cheque is in the post

Rule 8.3 requires client account reconciliations once every 6 months signed off by an external reporting accountant

Compare the statutory frameworks of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 (Visitors) and the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 (Trespassers / Non-Visitors) regarding who is protected, what types of damage are recoverable, and when an occupier is liable.

OLA 1957 protects lawful visitors (express/implied invitees, licensees, statutory right of entry) and covers BOTH personal injury and property damage; OLA 1984 covers trespassers/non-visitors for PERSONAL INJURY ONLY (recovery for property damage is expressly excluded by s.1(8)) and a duty arises ONLY if the 3 conditions of s.1(3) are met: (a) the occupier is aware of the danger or has reasonable grounds to believe it exists, (b) knows or has reasonable grounds to believe the other is in the vicinity of the danger, and (c) the risk is one against which the occupier may reasonably be expected to offer some protection — Key OLA distinctions tested on FLK1: (1) OLA 1957 covers both personal injury and property damage for visitors (with special rules in s.2(3)(a) for children + allurements, s.2(3)(b) for skilled tradespeople, s.2(4)(a) for warnings—effective only if in all the circumstances they enable the visitor to be reasonably safe—and s.2(4)(b) for independent contractors). (2) OLA 1984 covers ONLY personal injury (never property damage, s.1(8)), requires satisfying the s.1(3) three-limb threshold, and does not require warning against obvious natural dangers where an adult freely chooses to indulge in an inherently risky activity (*Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council*).

Both OLA 1957 and OLA 1984 allow claimants to recover for damaged personal property (such as clothing, watches, and vehicles)

Under OLA 1957 s.2(4)(a), putting up a warning sign automatically absolves the occupier of liability even if the sign does not enable the visitor to be reasonably safe

Under OLA 1984, an adult trespasser who dives headfirst into a shallow natural lake at night recovers in full despite obvious risk (*Tomlinson v Congleton BC*)

On SQE2 Oral Advocacy (Criminal Litigation), how is a contested Bail Application structured under the Bail Act 1976 (Section 4 & Schedule 1 Part I) for an indictable/either-way offence, and what are the three primary statutory grounds for objecting to bail?

Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 creates a general right (presumption) to unconditional bail (unless excluded, e.g., s.25 CJPOA 1994 for homicide/rape with a prior conviction, or modified where D was already on bail at the time of the alleged offence); for an imprisonable indictable/either-way offence under Schedule 1 Part I, the Prosecution may object only if there are SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING that, if released on bail (whether with or without conditions), the defendant would: (1) Fail to Surrender to custody (abscond), (2) Commit Further Offences while on bail, or (3) Interfere with Witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice (evaluated via statutory factors: nature/seriousness of offence and likely sentence, character/antecedents/associations/community ties, past bail record, and strength of the evidence); Defence advocacy responds by dismantling each Prosecution ground and proposing a proportionate package of Bail Conditions (residence, curfew, electronic tag, reporting to police station, non-contact, exclusion zone, passport surrender, surety) to mitigate any risk — In a Criminal Advocacy Bail station on SQE2: (1) Anchor in the s.4 Bail Act 1976 right to bail (and note the 'no real prospect of a custodial sentence' restriction on remanding in custody for non-violent/non-domestic/non-sexual offences where D would not receive custody if convicted). (2) Address each Prosecution Schedule 1 ground raised (Fail to Surrender, Commit Further Offences, Interfere with Witnesses) using the statutory factors (nature/seriousness, ties/antecedents, bail record, strength of evidence). (3) Present concrete, workable Bail Conditions tailored directly to each risk (never offer a 'security'—cash deposited pre-release—unless D has means, vs. a 'surety'—third party promising to forfeit money if D absconds).

The Magistrates' Court can remand a defendant in custody for a summary-only non-imprisonable offence whenever the prosecution objects

The Defendant bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that they will not abscond or commit further offences before bail can be granted

If the Magistrates' Court refuses bail at the first hearing, the defence can never make a further bail application or appeal to the Crown Court

Under the Insolvency Act 1986 (FLK1), compare the 'Relevant Time' clawback periods and mental/solvency requirements for setting aside (1) a Transaction at an Undervalue (s.238), (2) a Voidable Preference (s.239), and (3) a Floating Charge created for past value (s.245), and state the cap on the 'Prescribed Part' ring-fenced for unsecured creditors.

(1) Transaction at an Undervalue (s.238): within 2 YEARS before onset of insolvency (must be insolvent at the time or become insolvent as a result, which is presumed if with a connected person; defense if entered into in good faith for carrying on business with reasonable grounds to believe it would benefit the company); (2) Preference (s.239): within 6 MONTHS for an unconnected creditor or 2 YEARS for a connected person (requires proving the company was influenced by a subjective DESIRE to prefer, which is presumed if connected); (3) Avoidance of Floating Charge (s.245): within 12 MONTHS (unconnected, requires insolvency at creation) or 2 YEARS (connected, no insolvency required), invalid except to the extent of new money/goods supplied at or after creation; Prescribed Part is 50% of the first £10,000 of net floating charge realisations + 20% of the balance, capped at £800,000 — Under the Insolvency Act 1986: (1) s.238 (Undervalue): 2-year lookback for everyone (insolvency presumed if connected; statutory good-faith business rescue defence in s.238(5)). (2) s.239 (Preference): 6 months (unconnected) / 2 years (connected); per *Re MC Bacon*, genuine commercial pressure from an aggressive creditor NEGATES the subjective desire to prefer! (3) s.245 (Floating Charge for old debt): 12 months (unconnected + insolvent) / 2 years (connected, even if solvent). (4) The Prescribed Part (s.176A) ring-fences 50% of the first £10k + 20% thereafter of net property subject to floating charges for unsecured creditors, up to a statutory maximum of £800,000 (for charges created on/after 6 April 2020).

All three clawback provisions have a uniform 12-month lookback period regardless of whether the counterparty is connected or unconnected, and the Prescribed Part is capped at £600,000

A Preference under s.239 is automatically void if the creditor applied commercial pressure or threatened to sue, because commercial pressure proves a desire to prefer (*Re MC Bacon*)

In liquidation, floating charge holders are paid ahead of preferential creditors (employees and HMRC secondary preferential claims)

In Legal Services Regulation (FLK1 & FLK2), when is a non-FCA-authorised law firm permitted to carry on a regulated financial services activity under the s.327 FSMA 2000 Designated Professional Body (DPB / SRA Scope Rules) exemption, and what are the three principal money laundering offences under ss.327–329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA)?

Under s.327 FSMA 2000 (DPB regime), a non-FCA-authorised firm regulated by the SRA may carry on a regulated activity ONLY if: (1) it arises out of, or is complementary to, a particular non-FSMA professional legal service provided to that specific client, (2) it is incidental to the firm's overall activities, (3) the firm accounts to the client for any third-party commission/pecuniary reward (unless informed consent), and (4) it is not prohibited by SRA Scope Rules (e.g., advising on/buying specific retail investment products like life policies or pensions is barred unless through an FCA-authorised person under Art 29 RAO); under POCA 2002, the three principal offences (carrying up to 14 years' imprisonment) are s.327 (Concealing/disguising/converting/transferring criminal property), s.328 (Arranging—becoming concerned in an arrangement facilitating acquisition/retention/use/control of criminal property, though sham-free ordinary conduct of litigation is excluded per *Bowman v Fels*), and s.329 (Acquisition/use/possession of criminal property, subject to the adequate consideration defence) — (1) Under FSMA 2000: Check first if an RAO Exclusion applies (e.g., Art 67 'Necessary' exclusion, Art 70 Sale of Body Corporate >= 50% voting shares, Art 66 Trustees/PRs, Art 29 Arranging/Advising through an FCA-Authorised Person). If no exclusion applies, the firm relies on s.327 FSMA (DPB Exemption + SRA Scope Rules), which requires the activity to be complementary to a particular legal service to that client and incidental to the firm's business. (2) Under POCA 2002: ss.327–329 are the principal offences (defence: Authorised Disclosure / DAML SAR prior to the act); s.330 Failure to Disclose in the regulated sector uses an OBJECTIVE test ('knows or suspects, OR has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting'); and per *Bowman v Fels* [2005], ordinary conduct of litigation does not fall within s.328 arranging.

Under *Bowman v Fels*, conducting ordinary civil litigation or dividing matrimonial assets in divorce proceedings constitutes the s.328 POCA arranging offence unless NCA consent is obtained before serving every pleading

Law firms are completely exempt from FSMA 2000 for all investment management activities and may freely advise clients on which specific unit trusts or pension annuities to buy

Under POCA s.330 (Failure to Disclose in the Regulated Sector), a solicitor commits an offence only if they had actual subjective knowledge of money laundering (negligence/reasonable grounds to suspect is insufficient)

In Registered Land Law (FLK2 — Land Registration Act 2002), which legal leases, easements, and occupation rights qualify as Overriding Interests under Schedule 3 Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 on a registered disposition for valuable consideration, and how can a buyer overreach equitable beneficial interests under a trust of land?

Under LRA 2002 Schedule 3: Para 1 protects legal leases granted for a term NOT exceeding 7 years (leases > 7 years must be substantively registered under s.27(2)(b)); Para 2 protects the proprietary interest of a person in ACTUAL OCCUPATION of the land at the date of COMPLETION (unless they failed to disclose the interest on inquiry when reasonable to do so, OR their occupation was not obvious on a reasonably careful inspection and the buyer had no actual knowledge); Para 3 protects implied/prescriptive legal easements known to the buyer, obvious on inspection, or exercised within the past year; a buyer OVERREACHES equitable beneficial interests under a trust of land (defeating Sch 3 Para 2 even if the beneficiary is in actual occupation, *Flegg*) by paying the purchase/mortgage money to AT LEAST TWO TRUSTEES or a trust corporation (ss.2 & 27 LPA 1925) — Three vital LRA 2002 Schedule 3 rules on FLK2: (1) Para 1 covers ONLY LEGAL leases <= 7 years (an equitable lease never falls within Para 1 and can override only if the tenant is in actual occupation under Para 2!). (2) Para 2 requires a proprietary interest (e.g., trust beneficial interest, equitable lease, estate contract, proprietary estoppel—NOT a bare licence or matrimonial home right under FLA 1996 s.31) PLUS actual occupation at the time of disposition (completion), though the interest and occupation must exist by completion (*Abbey National v Cann*). (3) Overreaching (ss.2 & 27 LPA 1925) detaches the beneficiary's equitable trust interest from the land and shifts it into the sale proceeds ONLY if capital money is paid to >= 2 trustees (*City of London BS v Flegg* vs. *Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland*).

Expressly granted easements operate as overriding interests under Schedule 3 Paragraph 3 without needing substantive registration under s.27 LRA 2002

Equitable leases up to 7 years override under Schedule 3 Paragraph 1 without actual occupation, and paying purchase money to a single sole legal owner successfully overreaches a non-owning spouse's beneficial interest (*Boland*)

Under Schedule 3 Paragraph 2, the relevant date for testing whether the claimant is in actual occupation is the date of Exchange of Contracts, not Completion

In Equity and Trusts (FLK2), compare the test for Certainty of Objects in a Fixed Trust versus a Discretionary Trust (*IRC v Broadway Cottrell* vs. *McPhail v Doulton* and *Re Baden (No 2)*), and contrast the statutory formality rules of s.53(1)(b) and s.53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925.

Fixed Trust certainty of objects requires the 'Complete List Test' (*IRC v Broadway Cottrell*—capable of drawing up a complete list of every beneficiary); Discretionary Trust certainty of objects requires the 'Individual Ascertainability / Is or Is Not Test' (*McPhail v Doulton*—whether it can be said with certainty that any given individual is or is not a member of the class, requiring both conceptual certainty and administrative workability); under s.53(1)(b) LPA 1925, a declaration of trust over LAND must be manifested and proved by writing signed by the settlor (not by an agent; absence makes it unenforceable, not void, and s.53(2) exempts resulting/constructive trusts); under s.53(1)(c) LPA 1925, a DISPOSITION of a subsisting equitable interest (whether in land OR personalty!) must be in writing signed by the disponor or their lawfully authorised agent (absence makes it completely VOID, *Grey v IRC*) — Essential Trusts distinctions on FLK2: (1) Objects test: Fixed Trust = Complete List (*Broadway Cottrell*); Discretionary Trust = Individual Ascertainability 'Is or Is Not' (*McPhail v Doulton*), where conceptual uncertainty (e.g., 'my old friends') invalidates the trust, whereas evidential difficulty does not (*Re Baden (No 2)*). (2) Formalities: s.53(1)(b) applies ONLY to declarations of trust of LAND and requires writing signed by the settlor personally (merely unenforceable until signed). s.53(1)(c) applies to dispositions of subsisting equitable interests in ANY property (land or shares/personalty): an oral direction to trustees to hold the equitable interest on new trusts is VOID (*Grey v IRC*), UNLESS the beneficiary directs trustees to transfer BOTH legal and equitable title together to a third party (*Vandervell v IRC*) or assigns for full value creating a constructive trust (*Neville v Wilson*).

Under s.53(1)(b) LPA 1925, a solicitor can sign the written evidence of a declaration of trust of land as the settlor's agent

Both Fixed Trusts and Discretionary Trusts require the Complete List Test; s.53(1)(b) applies to personalty and shares, whereas s.53(1)(c) applies only to land

An oral direction by an adult beneficiary to their trustees to hold existing trust shares for the beneficiary's grandchildren is valid without writing (*Vandervell v IRC*)

On SQE2 Oral Advocacy (Dispute Resolution), a Defendant applies under CPR Part 13 to set aside a Default Judgment entered after the Defendant missed the deadline to file a Defence. What is the difference between Mandatory Ground (CPR 13.2) and Discretionary Ground (CPR 13.3), and how does the 3-stage *Denton v TH White* relief-from-sanctions test apply?

Under CPR 13.2 (Mandatory), the court MUST set aside a wrongly entered (irregular) default judgment as of right (e.g., entered before the time for Acknowledgment/Defence expired, or after an Acknowledgment/Defence was already filed, or where the whole claim was satisfied before judgment); under CPR 13.3 (Discretionary, for a regularly entered judgment), the court MAY set aside or vary the judgment if (1) the Defendant has a REAL PROSPECT of successfully defending the claim OR (2) there is some other good reason why the judgment should be set aside or the Defendant should be allowed to defend, taking into account whether the application was made PROMPTLY, PLUS applying the 3-stage *Denton v TH White* (CPR 3.9) test: Stage (1) assess the seriousness and significance of the breach, Stage (2) consider why the default occurred (good/bad reason), and Stage (3) evaluate all the circumstances of the case to deal justly with the application (including efficient conduct of litigation at proportionate cost and enforcing compliance with rules) — Setting aside Default Judgment (CPR 13.2 vs. 13.3 + *Denton*) is one of the most frequent SQE2 Civil Advocacy and CMA stations: (1) Always check CPR 13.2 FIRST—was the judgment irregularly entered (e.g., Claim Form was never validly served or time had not expired)? If so, setting aside is mandatory with costs against the Claimant. (2) If regularly entered, address CPR 13.3(1)(a)/(b) (real prospect of defending—more than merely arguable—or some other good reason), CPR 13.3(2) (promptness of application), AND the 3 stages of *Denton v TH White* [2014] EWCA Civ 906 under CPR 3.9 (1. Seriousness/significance, 2. Reason for default, 3. All the circumstances including CPR 3.9(1)(a) & (b)).

Under CPR 13.3, the Defendant need only show that the failure to file a Defence was caused by their solicitor's oversight, without needing to show a real prospect of defending the claim

If the Defendant establishes a real prospect of successfully defending the claim under CPR 13.3, the court must set aside the judgment even if the Defendant waited 18 months to apply without excuse

The *Denton v TH White* test applies only to criminal trials in the Crown Court

In Property Practice (FLK2), under the Standard Conditions of Sale (SCS, 5th Edition — residential) and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II (commercial leases), what are the completion deadline and Notice to Complete mechanics under the SCS, and what are the two statutory contracting-out procedures to exclude a commercial tenant's security of tenure under s.38A LTA 1954?

Under SCS 6.1.1, completion is due by 2:00 PM on the completion date (after which contract rate interest accrues on the balance); a non-defaulting party who is ready, able, and willing to complete may serve a Notice to Complete (SCS 6.8), making time of the essence and requiring completion within 10 WORKING DAYS (excluding the day of service); to contract out of LTA 1954 Part II security of tenure, the landlord must serve a statutory Health Warning Notice before the tenant is contractually bound—if served AT LEAST 14 DAYS before commitment, the tenant signs a Simple Declaration; if served LESS THAN 14 DAYS before commitment, the tenant must swear a Statutory Declaration before an independent solicitor/commissioner for oaths, and the lease must endorse the agreement and declaration — (1) Under SCS 6.1 & 6.8 (and SCPC 9.1 & 9.8 for commercial sales), the contractual completion time is 2:00 PM, and serving a Notice to Complete makes time of the essence and grants 10 working days to complete. (2) Under LTA 1954 s.38A, contracting out of business security of tenure requires: (a) Landlord's Warning Notice -> (b) Tenant's Simple Declaration (if >= 14 days before tenant is bound by lease or agreement for lease) OR Statutory Declaration before an independent solicitor (if (c) Reference to both in the lease. (3) Under the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995, tenants under 'new' leases (granted on/after 1 Jan 1996) are automatically released upon lawful assignment unless required to sign an Authorised Guarantee Agreement (AGA), which lasts only while their immediate assignee holds the lease.

Completion under the SCS is due by 4:30 PM, and a Notice to Complete gives the defaulting party 28 calendar days; contracting out of the LTA 1954 requires a joint application to the County Court in all cases

If the landlord serves the LTA 1954 Warning Notice 7 days before completion, a Simple Declaration signed by the tenant is valid

In a commercial lease granted after 1 January 1996, the original tenant remains automatically liable under privity of contract for the entire 25-year lease term even after assigning the lease with the landlord's consent

What is the official examination architecture of the UK Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SRA SQE1 and SQE2), and what are the four statutory requirements to qualify as a solicitor of England and Wales?

SQE1 consists of two 180-question single-best-answer MCQ papers (FLK1 and FLK2, 5 choices A–E, split into two 153-minute sessions per paper); SQE2 consists of 16 practical legal skills stations (12 written + 4 oral over 5 half-days, weighted 50% skills / 50% application of law); qualification requires: (1) a degree (or equivalent), (2) passing SQE1 and SQE2, (3) 2 years full-time equivalent Qualifying Work Experience (QWE) in up to 4 organisations, and (4) SRA Character and Suitability approval — Administered by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) and Kaplan, SQE1 assesses Functioning Legal Knowledge across FLK1 (180 MCQs) and FLK2 (180 MCQs), with Ethics & Professional Conduct tested pervasively (unflagged) throughout both papers. Passing SQE1 is a prerequisite to sitting SQE2 (16 stations: 4 oral and 12 written across 5 practice contexts), paired with 2 years FTE Qualifying Work Experience (QWE).

SQE1 consists of essay exams on FLK1 and FLK2 with a separate standalone Ethics paper; SQE2 requires a 2-year formal Training Contract approved in advance by the High Court

SQE1 has 100 true/false questions and SQE2 has 8 oral advocacy stations weighted 100% on advocacy style

Candidates may sit SQE2 before passing SQE1, and QWE must be completed in a single law firm after passing SQE2

In the Tort of Negligence (FLK1), distinguish between Primary Victims and Secondary Victims of pure psychiatric harm under *Page v Smith*, *Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire*, and *Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust* [2024] UKSC 1.

A Primary Victim is directly involved within the zone of physical danger (or reasonably believes they are) and recovers for a recognised psychiatric illness if SOME physical injury was reasonably foreseeable (*Page v Smith*, even if no physical injury actually occurred); a Secondary Victim is an unwilling witness not in physical danger who must suffer a recognised psychiatric illness induced by a sudden shock AND satisfy all 4 *Alcock* control mechanisms: (1) close tie of love and affection with the immediate victim (presumed only for spouses/fiancés and parents/children), (2) proximity in time and space to the accident or its immediate aftermath, (3) perception with their own unaided senses, and (4) witnessing an external traumatic ACCIDENT rather than a subsequent medical crisis resulting from earlier clinical negligence (*Paul* [2024]) — Both Primary and Secondary Victims must suffer a medically recognised psychiatric illness (not mere grief or distress). Under *Page v Smith*, a Primary Victim in the zone of physical risk needs only foreseeability of physical harm. Under *Alcock*, *White* (rescuers/police not in physical danger are Secondary Victims), and the UK Supreme Court decision in *Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust* [2024] UKSC 1, Secondary Victims must prove a close tie of love and affection (presumed only for parent/child and spouse/fiancé; siblings and others must prove it in fact), direct unaided perception of an external accident or its immediate aftermath, and psychiatric injury caused by sudden shock.

Professional rescuers and employees are automatically classified as Primary Victims even when they are never exposed to physical danger (*White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire*)

A sibling or grandparent is presumed in law to have a close tie of love and affection without needing to prove it by evidence

Normal human grief and emotional distress without a medically recognised psychiatric illness are compensable for Secondary Victims

UK SRA SQE1 (FLK1 & FLK2) & SQE2 — Contract, Tort, Dispute Resolution, Business Law, Land Law, Trusts, Criminal Litigation & SRA Accounts Rules

Authoritative UK Solicitors Qualifying Examination (SRA SQE1 FLK1/FLK2 & SQE2) flashcards covering the 7 SRA Principles, Contract Law (consideration, UCTA 1977/CRA 2015, remoteness), Tort (psychiatric harm, OLA 1957/1984), Civil Procedure Rules (service, tracks, Part 36, summary/default judgment & Denton), Companies Act 2006 & Insolvency Act 1986, Judicial Review & HRA 1998, Registered Land (LRA 2002 Sch 3 & overreaching), Co-Ownership severance, LTA 1954, Equity & Trusts (certainties, s.53(1)(b)/(c), tracing), Wills & Intestacy (£322k legacy, IHT), Criminal Law & PACE 1984, SRA Accounts Rules, FSMA/POCA, and SQE2 Advocacy.

Level: advanced
Languages: en → en
Cards: 32
Markdown: UK SRA SQE1 (FLK1 & FLK2) & SQE2 — Contract, Tort, Dispute Resolution, Business Law, Land Law, Trusts, Criminal Litigation & SRA Accounts Rules (.md)

Flashcards (32)